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Abstract: In recent decade safety of medical and biological products has been concerned in the light of benefit/risks 
and risk assessment. For new medical products and new drugs, unanticipated side effects that rise after consuming 
the new product is a dominant factor in decision making. The aim of this project is to design a fuzzy inference 
system for risk assessment of medical cases. Classical risk assessment in the crisp space precisely determines 
boundary sharply dissevers safe state from unsafe one. In contrary, fuzzy set shows smooth change from safe to 
unsafe state. It indicates that safety can be considered as a fuzzy issue because plant safety cannot be strictly 
classified as safe or unsafe, as inherent hazards always occur. 
[Hafshejani M K, Sattari Naeini M, Mohammadsharifi A, Yahiapoor M. Use of Fuzzy Logic for Risk/Benefit 
Assessment in Medical/Biological Cases. Life Sci J 2012;9(3):2270-2273] (ISSN:1097-8135). 
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1. Introduction 
Today’s healthcare products are developed and 
used within a complex system involving a number of 
key participants (Report to the FDA commissioner, 
1999). The choice to use a drug, biological product, 
or device involves balancing the benefits to be gained 
with the potential risks of using a product (Report to 
the FDA commissioner, 1999). In recent decades 
safety of medical products have been concerned in 
the light of several types of risks and risk assessment. 
For new products, unanticipated side effects that rise 
after consuming the new product is a dominant 
factor. In addition, FDAs focused on ensuring the 
appropriate use of products in medical practice. Some 
reports have focused on the human/economic costs of 
medication errors, as well as serious adverse events 
that have occurred even when a medical product has 
been used appropriately (Report to the FDA 
commissioner, 1999). Risks have different source, 
hence effective management of each is different. To 
understand the complexity of risk assessment and 
management of medical products, it is important to 
understand the types/source of risks and its 
assessment. Figure 1 shows, FDA evaluates the 
risks/benefits for the population, the prescriber 
manages risks/benefits for the individual and patients 
make decisions about treatment choices based on 
their personal assessment of benefits/risks. 
Security in any system should be commensurate 
with its risks. However, the process to determine 
which security controls are appropriate and cost 
effective is quite often a complex and sometimes a 
subjective matter. One of the prime functions of 
security risk analysis is to put this process onto a 
more objective basis. There are a number of distinct 
approaches to risk analysis. However, these 
essentially break down into two types: quantitative 
and qualitative (www.security-risk-analysis.com) 
Quantitative risk assessment employs two 
fundamental elements; the probability of an event 
occurring and the likely loss should it occur. 
Quantitative medical risk analysis makes use of a 
single figure produced from these elements. This is 
called the 'Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)' or the 
'Estimated Annual Cost (EAC)'. This is calculated for 
an event by simply multiplying the potential loss by 
the probability. It is thus theoretically possible to 
rank events in order of risk (ALE) and to make 
decisions based upon this. The problems with this 
type of risk analysis are usually associated with the 
unreliability and inaccuracy of the data 
(www.security-risk-analysis.com) Probability can 
rarely be precise and can, in some cases, promote 
complacency. In addition, controls and 
countermeasures often tackle a number of potential 
events and the events themselves are frequently 
interrelated. Notwithstanding the drawbacks, a 
number of organisations have successfully adopted 
quantitative risk analysis (www.security-risk-
analysis.com). 
In this paper, a fuzzy logic system (Zadeh, 1965; 
1968; 1973; 1984; Ramadan et al. 2012;  Hanafy, 
2011; Emarah et al. 2011;) is designed to perform a 
systematic risk assessment in medical globe. The 
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presented system is applied for a case of medical risk 
analysis and the results are assessed and discussed. 
 
 
Figure 1. On balancing risks and benefits, FDA 
evaluates the risks/benefits for the population, the 
prescriber manages risks/benefits for the individual 
and patients make decisions about treatment choices 
based on their personal assessment of benefits/risks 
(Report to the FDA commissioner, 1999). 
 
2. Constructed Fuzzy Inference System  
The category of frequency of consequence is 
represented by numbers from 1 to 5, where category 
1 is for very low frequency and opposite category 5 is 
for very high frequency. The member functions for 
frequencies are shown in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Fuzzy Set for the definition of Frequency 
 
The category of severity of consequence is 
represented by numbers from 1 to 5, where category 
1 is for negligible severity and opposite category 5 is 
for catastrophic severity. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Fuzzy set for the definition of Severity 
 
 
The category of medical risk is represented by 
numbers from 0 to 10 as demonstrated below. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Fuzzy set for the definition of Risk 
 
3. Fault tree  
For this work, a simple fault tree could be 
considered as figure 5. This is a typical fault tree to 
be applied for a systematic fuzzy interface. 
 
 
Figure 5. Typical fault tree 
 
 
4. Rule Table 
A set of 25 rules is prepared for this work. As an 
example “If Frequency is high and Severity is 
moderate then the risk is substantial”. Such a rule 
table is constructed to predict the state of risk 
assessed for different states in severity and frequency. 
The performed table of variation in risk can be as 
table 1. 
 
5. Data generation  
We can normalize data points to be within a 
specific range. In this case, data points are 
normalized to the range of [0,1]. Although, raw data 
points could be used as they are all in the range of 1 
to 5. 
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Table 1. A part of constructed fuzzy data base 
Some sets of the fuzzy data base (32768 points) 
Frequency of 
medical sub event 
1 
Frequency of 
medical sub event 
2 
Frequency of 
medical sub event 
3 
Frequency of 
medical sub  event 
4 
Frequency of 
medical sub 
event 5 
Overall  
frequency 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25 
 (0.75 V.low, 
0.25 Low) 
1.375 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.75 
 (0.25 V.low, 
0.75 Low) 
1.425 
1.25 
 (0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
2.25 
 (0.75 Low, 0.25 
Average) 
1.575 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.75 
 (0.25 V.low, 0.75 
Low) 
2.25 
 (0.75 Low, 0.25 
Average) 
1.625 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.25 
 (0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
2.75  
(0.25 Low, 0.75 
Average) 
4.75 
 (0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
2.275 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.75  
(0.25 V.low, 0.75 
Low) 
1.25 
 (0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
3.25 
 (0.75 Average, 
0.25 High) 
3.75 
 (0.25 Average, 
0.75 High) 
2.275 
1.25  
(0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
1.75  
(0.25 V.low, 0.75 
Low) 
3.25 
 (0.75 Average, 
0.25 High) 
2.75 
 (0.25 Low, 0.75 
Average) 
4.75 
 (0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
2.725 
2.25  
(0.75 Low, 0.25 
Average) 
2.75  
(0.25 Low, 0.75 
Average) 
3.25 
 (0.75 Average, 
0.25 High) 
1.75  
(0.25 V.low, 0.75 
Low) 
4.75 
 (0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
2.925 
3.25  
(0.75 Average, 
0.25 High) 
4.75  
(0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
1.25 
 (0.75 V.low, 0.25 
Low) 
2.75 
 (0.25 Low, 0.75 
Average) 
4.75 
 (0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
3.325 
4.75  
(0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
4.75  
(0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
4.75 
 (0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
4.75  
(0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
4.75 
 (0.25 High, 0.75 
V. High) 
4.62 
 
Table 2. Normalized data base 
Sample of the normalized training data base (32768 points) 
Frequency 
of sub event  
1 
Frequency of 
sub event 
 2 
Frequency 
of sub event 
 3 
Frequenc
y of sub event 
 4 
Frequen
cy of sub 
event 
 5 
Overall  
frequency 
0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.09375 
0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.1875 0.10625 
0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.14375 
0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.1875 0.3125 0.15625 
0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.4375 0.9375 0.31875 
0.0625 0.1875 0.0625 0.5625 0.6875 0.31875 
0.0625 0.1875 0.5625 0.4375 0.9375 0.43125 
0.3125 0.4375 0.5625 0.1875 0.9375 0.48125 
0.5625 0.9375 0.0625 0.4375 0.9375 0.58125 
0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.905 
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6. Conclusions 
The choice to use a new drug, biological product, 
or medical device involves balancing the benefits and 
risks of the product. There are many different 
approaches to medical risk assessment such as 
classical models based on possibility and probability 
and calculation of risk results from the product of 
frequency and severity. Fuzzy logic as a new 
approach to risk analysis is presented as one of the 
best ways to deal with all the types of risk assessment 
including lack of knowledge. In this paper, a fuzzy 
logic interface is applied for a systematic risk 
assessment on a simple fault tree. This shows how 
fuzzy logic could be applied to the aim of risk 
assessment. The fuzzy sets could be optimized based 
on the obtained results.  
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